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NOTES

Leave It on the Field
TOO EXPANSIVE AN APPROACH TO EVALUATING
TITLE IX COMPLIANCE IN BIEDIGER V.
QUINNIPIAC UNIVERSITY?
I.

INTRODUCTION

Imagine a woman who is a first-year student at a
university. She loves playing softball and enjoyed four years on
her high school varsity team, but she was not recruited to play
in college and is unsure whether her skill level will enable her
to make it onto her university’s team. When she sees the
announcement for walk-on tryouts posted in the gym, she
shows up determined to give it her best shot. Although her skill
level is not up to the standard of the majority of the women
present at the tryout, she is pleased to learn that she is being
offered a spot on the team. However, the coach tells her that
she will only be able to practice with the team, cannot travel
with the team to away games, and will not be provided with a
uniform. Other candidates reject offers to join the practice
squad under these conditions, but she happily accepts. She
enjoys the camaraderie of a team atmosphere, loves the sport,
and finds practices to be an excellent way to keep fit. Although
the coach is unable to devote as much attention to her as to the
women on the competition roster, the woman is satisfied with
her experience and remains on the practice squad throughout
the season. She is told that next year she has a good shot at
making it onto the competition roster. Now imagine a court of
law deciding that this woman does not count towards the
university’s number of female athletes for purposes of Title IX
because her athletic participation is not “meaningful.” Imagine
the court deciding that this woman does not count because her
participation is merely the product of a “false roster floor.”
Should the court be entitled to determine whether her
265
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experience is meaningful? Doesn’t the fact that the woman
decided to accept the offer and remain on the team throughout
the season indicate that her participation was meaningful?
According to the legislation’s primary sponsor, Senator
Birch Bayh, Title IX of the Education Amendments of 19721 was
enacted to provide for the women of America something that is
rightfully theirs: an equal chance to attend the schools of their
choice, to develop the skills they want, and to apply those skills
with the knowledge that they will have a fair chance to secure
the jobs of their choice with equal pay for equal work.2
It is doubtful that, at the time of its enactment, Senator
Bayh foresaw the enormous implications that this statute
would have on collegiate athletics or the many hurdles that
would arise from enforcing Title IX in that area. However, the
hurdles have been countless, and new questions continue to
arise regarding the avenues of compliance.3 The Office of Civil
Rights (OCR) of the Department of Education is the agency
tasked with the enforcement of Title IX.4 The OCR has issued
numerous regulations to guide educational institutions’
compliance efforts in the area of athletics.5 Most basically, the
OCR has determined that Title IX requires schools that receive
federal funding to provide “equal athletic opportunities for
members of both sexes,” which relies in part on “whether the
selection of sports and levels of competition effectively
accommodate the interests and abilities of members of both
sexes.”6 In 1979, the OCR provided that a school would be
entitled to the presumption of Title IX compliance if
“intercollegiate level participation opportunities for male and
female students are provided in numbers substantially
proportionate to their respective enrollments.”7 This
“substantial proportionality” standard, the primary focus of
this note, is contained in the first prong of the OCR Policy
Interpretation’s three-part test.8

1

Education Amendments of 1972, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2006).
118 CONG. REC. 5808 (1972).
3
See, e.g., Mansourian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 602 F.3d 957 (9th Cir.
2010); Ollier v. Sweetwater Union High Sch. Dist., 604 F. Supp. 2d 1264 (S.D. Cal. 2009).
4
See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 934
(D.C. Cir. 2004).
5
See id. at 934-35.
6
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994).
7
44 Fed. Reg. 71,413, 71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
8
Id.
2
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In 2009, members and the coach of the women’s
volleyball team at Quinnipiac University were granted a
preliminary injunction against Quinnipiac when the District
Court for the District of Connecticut, in the case of Biediger v.
Quinnipiac University, determined that the plaintiffs were likely
to succeed on the merits of their claim that the university’s
athletics department failed to comply with Title IX.9 Quinnipiac
maintained that the plan its athletic department intended to
implement for the 2009-2010 school year would bring it into
compliance under the “substantial proportionality” standard
contained in first prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s threepart test.10 Specifically, Quinnipiac anticipated that it would
provide athletic participation opportunities to both sexes in
numbers substantially proportional to their representation in
the student body for the 2009-2010 school year.11 The Biediger
court, however, questioned whether the athletic participation
opportunities for women that Quinnipiac relied upon were
sufficiently “meaningful” to be counted.12 When a roster spot
reserved for a woman goes unfilled (i.e., no woman actually
participates), the participation opportunity is unquestionably
not meaningful.13 However, the Biediger court went further to
suggest that even a roster spot that is filled might not be
counted if the experience of the participant in that spot is not of
a certain quality.14 The court was particularly concerned with
Quinnipiac’s practice of setting roster floors—allocating a
certain amount of roster spots for women’s teams and requiring
coaches to carry no fewer than that amount of athletes.15 While
the court did not go so far as to explicitly reject roster floors as a
valid means of achieving Title IX compliance, it made a
suggestion to that effect.16
This note will examine the reasoning and implications
of the Biediger decision and make an argument that, regardless
of the outcome on the merits, the court’s reasoning represents a
potentially worrisome trend. First, this note will argue that in
fashioning remedies, courts should carefully balance the public
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16

Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Conn. 2009).
Id. at 281.
Id.
Id. at 295.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id. at 296.
Id.
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interest of enforcing Title IX with the interest of providing
educational institutions autonomy to make their own spending
decisions. Secondly, it will argue that the court in Biediger v.
Quinnipiac University erred in taking an unprecedented
subjective17 approach to evaluating Quinnipiac’s compliance
under the “substantial proportionality” standard of the OCR
Policy Interpretation’s three-part test. Specifically, the court
should not have expanded its analysis to include a
determination of whether the participation of female athletes
was sufficiently “meaningful.” Finally, this note will argue that
the use of roster floors by universities should be a permissible
means of complying with Title IX.
Part II will review the background of Title IX and, in
particular, the OCR regulations issued to guide institutions in their
compliance efforts in the area of collegiate athletics. Part III will
examine the “substantial proportionality” standard of the OCR
Policy Interpretation’s three-part test. Additionally, the Part will
discuss the facts and reasoning of the court in Biediger v.
Quinnipiac University, and will compare that case to one of its
predecessor cases, Choike v. Slippery Rock University. Finally, Part
III will discuss the implications of the court’s decision in Biediger,
specifically as they pertain to the use of roster management policies
and to the court’s departure from treating the first prong of the
OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test as an almost purely
objective standard.
Part IV will suggest an approach for the future for
evaluating compliance based on the “substantial proportionality”
standard. First, the Part will argue that courts must perform a
balancing act in order to best resolve the prevalent conflict between
the interests of schools in making spending decisions with regard
to their own athletic programs and the public’s interest in enforcing
Title IX. Additionally, it will argue that the “substantial
proportionality” prong should remain a largely objective standard
and that the Biediger court improperly expanded the scope of its
analysis to include a highly subjective element. Finally, it will
argue that roster floors, while admittedly imperfect, should be a
permissible means for schools to comply with Title IX because of
the important benefits they offer.

17

For purposes of this note, a “subjective” approach with respect to the
“substantial proportionality” standard refers to a court’s willingness to examine an
athletic participant’s personal experience on a sports team, whereas an “objective”
approach refers to a strictly number-based application of the standard.

2010]

II.

LEAVE IT ON THE FIELD

269

BACKGROUND OF TITLE IX: GOALS, REQUIREMENTS, AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR COLLEGIATE ATHLETICS

Title IX of the Education Amendments of 197218 was
enacted by Congress in response to an observed pattern of
manifest and abundant discrimination against women in the
educational arena, and was designed to prohibit
“discrimination on the basis of sex in federally funded
educational programs and activities.”19 As directed by Congress,
the Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare (HEW), the
predecessor agency to the Department of Education, issued
regulations in 1975 implementing Title IX in the area of
intercollegiate athletics.20 These regulations require that
recipients of federal funding provide “equal athletic
opportunity for members of both sexes,” compliance with which
is determined by examining ten non-exhaustive factors, the
first being “whether the selection of sports and levels of
competition effectively accommodate the interests and abilities
of members of both sexes.”21 In 1979, the Office of Civil Rights
of the HEW issued a Policy Interpretation to clarify the Title IX
regulatory requirements.22 Specifically, it set out three areas to
guide educational institutions in their compliance efforts: (1)
equal athletic financial assistance; (2) equal treatment and
benefits for athletic teams; and (3) effective accommodation of
student interests and abilities.23
With regard to the third of these areas, the OCR Policy
Interpretation included a three-part test defining what
constitutes “effective accommodation” of “the interests and
18

20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (2006).
Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 934 (D.C. Cir.
2004). The act states, “No person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be
excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination
under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance, except
that . . . .” and lays out nine standard exceptions. 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688.
20
34 C.F.R. § 106.41(c) (1994).
21
Id. The other nine factors are as follows:
19

(2) The provision of equipment and supplies; (3) Scheduling of games and
practice time; (4) Travel and per diem allowance; (5) Opportunity to receive
coaching and academic tutoring; (6) Assignment and compensation of coaches
and tutors; (7) Provision of locker rooms, practice and competitive facilities;
(8) Provision of medical and training facilities and services; (9) Provision of
housing and dining facilities and services; (10) Publicity.
Id.
22
23

44 Fed. Reg. 71,413 (Dec. 11, 1979).
Id. at 71,414.
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abilities of both sexes.”24 The first part, which is the focus of
this note, is “[w]hether intercollegiate level participation
opportunities for male and female students are provided in
numbers substantially proportionate to their respective
enrollments.”25 In 1980, the responsibility of Title IX
implementation fell to the newly created United States
Department of Education, and the 1975 regulations were recodified but remained essentially the same.26 In 1996, the OCR
of the Department of Education issued a “Clarification
Memorandum” on the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part
test, accompanied by a “Dear Colleague” letter to interested
parties,27 which confirmed that an institution could comply with
the test by satisfying any one of the three prongs, and that the
three-part test “is only one of many factors that the
Department examines to assess an institution’s overall
compliance with Title IX and the 1975 Regulations.”28
Despite these early efforts to clearly explicate an
educational institution’s Title IX responsibilities with regard to
athletics, shortly after the enactment of Title IX, a fundamental
24

Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 935; 44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418.
44 Fed. Reg. at 71,418. The second part of the test is “Where the members
of one sex have been and are underrepresented among intercollegiate athletes, whether
the institution can show a history and continuing practice of program expansion which
is demonstrably responsive to the developing interest and abilities of the members of
that sex,” and the third part is:
25

Where the members of one sex are underrepresented among intercollegiate
athletes, and the institution cannot show a continuing practice of program
expansion such as that cited above, whether it can be demonstrated that the
interests and abilities of the members of that sex have been fully and
effectively accommodated by the present program.
Id.
26

Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 934.
“Dear Colleague” letters are official correspondence generally distributed
in bulk by one or more members of Congress to “colleagues of a Member, committees,
officers of the two chambers, and congressional staff organizations” with the purpose of
“encourag[ing] others to cosponsor or oppose a bill.” R. ERIC PETERSON, CRS REPORT
FOR CONGRESS, “DEAR COLLEAGUE” LETTERS: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1, http://digital.
library.unt.edu/govdocs/crs//data/2005/upl-meta-crs-6161/RS21667_2005Jan04.pdf. The
letters generally include a description of the proposed legislation along with reasons for
supporting or opposing it. Id. at 2.
28
Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n, 366 F.3d at 935; see also Dear Colleague
Letter from Norma Cantu, Ass’t Sec’y for Civil Rights, Dep’t of Educ., Clarification of
Intercollegiate Athletics Policy Guidance: The Three-Part Test (Jan. 16, 1996), http://
www.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ocr/docs/clarific.html [hereinafter Clarification Memo].
The “‘Clarification Memorandum’ . . . provide[s] further information and guidelines for
assessing compliance under the three part test” and “contains many examples
illustrating how institutions may meet each prong of the [OCR Policy Interpretation’s]
three-part test and explains how participation opportunities are to be counted under
Title IX.” Cohen v. Brown Univ. (Cohen II), 101 F.3d 155, 167 (1st Cir. 1996).
27
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debate—with great ramifications for college athletics—arose as
to the interpretation of the phrase “receiving Federal financial
assistance.”29 Those who favored the “institution-wide approach”
interpreted the phrase as requiring an entire institution to
comply with the requirements of Title IX if any of its programs
or departments received federal funds; those who favored the
“program specific approach,” however, interpreted the phrase as
requiring only the particular program or department receiving
the funds to comply with Title IX requirements.30 With the 1988
amendments to the Civil Rights Restoration Act of 1987,
Congress settled the debate in favor of the “institution-wide
approach,” clarifying that the terms “program or activity” and
“program” within the meaning of Title IX refer to “all of the
operations of . . . a college, university, or other postsecondary
institution, or a public system of higher education, . . . any part
of which is extended Federal financial assistance.”31 This
interpretation had “major implications for college athletics,”
since universities receiving federal financial assistance in areas
as distinct as research and scholarship funds were required to
apply the Title IX requirements in their athletic departments.32
For example, the University of Rochester, a private research
institution in New York State, received $34.5 million in 2009
“from research programs funded by the American Recovery and
Reinvestment Act.”33 Although these federal grants “fund a broad
array of scientific programs” having nothing to do with
athletics,34 the university’s receipt of them means that not only
its science programs, but all of the university’s programs,
including the athletic department, are subject to the
requirements of Title IX.
Title IX provides both a complex administrative
enforcement scheme, as well as a private cause of action for
individuals.35 The administrative scheme allows injured
persons to file complaints with the Department of Education,
29

See generally Brian L. Porto, Annotation, Suits by Female College Athletes
Against Colleges and Universities Claiming that Decisions to Discontinue Particular
Sports or to Deny Varsity Status to Particular Sports Deprive Plaintiffs of Equal
Educational Opportunities Required by Title IX, 129 A.L.R. FED. 571 (1996).
30
Id.
31
20 U.S.C. § 1687 (2006).
32
Porto, supra note 29, at § 2[a].
33
University Receives $34.5M in Federal Stimulus Funding, UNIV. OF
ROCHESTER NEWS (Oct. 15, 2009), http://www.rochester.edu/news/show.php?id=3466.
34
Id.
35
Brust v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 2:07-cv-1488, 2007 WL 4365521,
at *5-6 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 12, 2007).
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which both investigates these allegations and periodically
conducts its own “compliance reviews.”36 If the Department of
Education finds that an institution is in violation of Title IX, it
first attempts to remedy the situation informally, and if
unsuccessful, may hold an administrative hearing that could
result in the termination of the institution’s federal funding.37
As for the private cause of action, successful plaintiffs are
entitled to a range of possible remedies, including equitable
Alongside
the
relief
and
compensatory
damages.38
administrative scheme, Congress’s establishment of a private
right of action demonstrates its intent to effect strict
enforcement of Title IX.39
III.

THE SUBSTANTIAL PROPORTIONALITY STANDARD

A.

Challenges to the Proportionality Standard

The first prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s threepart test, the “substantial proportionality” standard, has been the
source of much debate, challenged both for its consistency with
the language and goals of Title IX, and for its constitutionality.
1. Challenges Based on Section 1681(b)
One target of attack on the “substantial proportionality”
standard has been the potential inconsistency of the first prong
with Section 1681(b) of the Title IX statute.40 Specifically,
opponents of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test
have argued that treating the first prong as a “safe harbor”—
meaning that schools are entitled to a presumption that they
are in compliance with Title IX if they can show “substantial
proportionality” between their male and female athletic
participation opportunities and overall enrollment—contradicts
Section 1681(b)’s statement, which says that Title IX does not
require
any education institution to grant preferential or disparate
treatment to members of one sex on account of an imbalance which
may exist with respect to the total number or percentage of persons

36
37
38
39
40

Id. at *5.
Id.
Id. at *6.
Id. at *5-6.
See Cohen II, 101 F.3d 155, 174-76 (1st Cir. 1996).
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of that sex participating in or receiving the benefits of any federally
supported program or activity, in comparison with the total number
or percentage of persons of that sex in any community.41

Courts have held that the OCR Policy Interpretation’s
three-part test is not in fact inconsistent with Section 1681(b).42
For one thing, the language of the statute suggests that a
proportionality standard like the one adopted in the three-part
test is an acceptable, although not mandatory, means of
complying with Title IX.43 Specifically, the phrase “does not
require” implies that the remedial action that is described in the
words that follow is not barred by the statute; if it were, the
section would be superfluous.44 Further, the three-part test does
not require institutions to comply with Title IX through the
“substantial proportionality” standard, since it provides two other
avenues of compliance, either of which is sufficient on its own.45
2. Challenges Based on Constitutionality
Although the Supreme Court has, in such cases as
Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,46 rejected as unconstitutional
a remedial strategy for countering discrimination that allocates
employment opportunities in numbers proportional to a group’s
representation in the general population, courts have found that
the collegiate athletics context is distinct from the employment
context and thus calls for a different result.47 In the
employment context, members of both sexes are generally
qualified for a given position. On the other hand, because
college sports teams are generally gender-segregated (such that
a man is not qualified for a women’s team and vice versa),
decisions regarding how many athletic opportunities will be
allocated to each gender must be determined in advance.48
Consequently, a school’s strategy in using enrollment data to
determine the proper allocation of its athletic opportunities is
not equivalent to the type of remedial scheme rejected as a

41

20 U.S.C. § 1681(b).
See Neal v. Bd. of Trs. of Cal. State Univs., 198 F.3d 763, 771 (9th Cir. 1999).
43
See id.
44
It is redundant to say something is not required when that thing is not
permitted in the first place. Id.
45
Id. at 771 n.7.
46
515 U.S. 200, 204-05 (1995).
47
Neal, 198 F.3d at 772-73 n.8.
48
Id.
42
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quota system under strict scrutiny review in Adarand.49 Under
the intermediate scrutiny standard of review applied to
government policies of gender classification,50 courts have
repeatedly upheld the constitutionality of Title IX and its
accompanying Department of Education regulations, including
the OCR Policy Interpretation.51 The OCR has made clear its
intention to “provide[] institutions with flexibility and choice
regarding how they will provide nondiscriminatory
participation opportunities” in their athletic programs.52 As for
the “substantial proportionality” prong of the OCR Policy
Interpretation’s three-part test, courts have consistently held
that universities can bring themselves into compliance both by
increasing athletic participation opportunities for the
underrepresented gender and by decreasing athletic
participation opportunities for the overrepresented gender.53
There have been similar arguments that the first prong
of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test violates the
Equal Protection Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments in addition to exceeding the OCR’s statutory
authority by actually requiring the same intentional
discrimination that Title IX forbids.54 The supposed intentional
discrimination results from requiring universities to
discriminate against men without regard to interests and
abilities, but rather based solely on enrollment.55 Specifically, it
has been argued that gender-conscious remedies should be
49

Id. The Court in Adarand reviewed the constitutionality of a federal
government policy under strict scrutiny analysis because the policy was one of racial
classification. See generally Adarand, 515 U.S. 200. To survive strict scrutiny review, the
government’s policy of racial classification must serve a compelling governmental interest
and the means chosen must be narrowly tailored to achieve that interest. Id. at 227.
50
Under the intermediate scrutiny standard, the policy of gender
classification must serve an important governmental objective and the means chosen
must substantially relate to the achievement of that objective. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S.
190, 197 (1976).
51
Neal, 198 F.3d at 772. For a discussion of cases in which Title IX and the
OCR Policy Interpretation have been challenged and upheld by the judicial system, see
Elisa Hatlevig, Title IX Compliance: Looking Past the Proportionality Prong, 12 SPORTS
LAW. J. 87 (2005).
52
Clarification Memo, supra note 28.
53
Neal, 198 F.3d at 769-70 (citing Horner v. Ky. High Sch. Athletic Ass’n, 43
F.3d 265, 272 (6th Cir. 1994); Kelly v. Bd. of Trs., 35 F.3d 265, 269 (7th Cir. 1994);
Roberts v. Colo. State Bd. of Agric., 998 F.2d 824, 830 (10th Cir. 1993); Cohen v. Brown
Univ. (Cohen I), 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993)).
54
See Nat’l Wrestling Coaches Ass’n v. Dep’t of Educ., 366 F.3d 930, 935-36
(D.C. Cir. 2004); Neal, 198 F.3d at 767 (appellants argued that intentional discrimination
is avoided only when schools provide opportunities in proportion to interest).
55
Neal, 198 F.3d at 767.
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permissible only to the extent that “schools provide
opportunities to males and females in proportion to their
relative levels of interest in sports participation.”56 Courts have
rejected this argument, emphasizing that in light of its history,
Title IX logically permits the use of gender-conscious remedies,
and that these remedies should not be so limited as to render
them ineffective.57 In a 1999 case, Neal v. Board of Trustees of
California State Universities, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth
Circuit noted that although men apparently expressed a
greater interest in athletic participation than women, this
“interest gap” was continuously narrowing, as more and more
opportunities were provided for women.58 In Neal, the court
discussed the Cohen I59 and Cohen II60 cases, which both
addressed the question whether schools could comply with Title
IX by making their athletic participation numbers proportional
to enrollment as opposed to interest.61 The court in Neal
reiterated the reasoning, employed in both Cohen I and Cohen
II, that “a central aspect of Title IX’s purpose was to encourage
women to participate in sports,” and that increased
opportunities (such as available roster spots and scholarships)
would help increase demand and dispel stereotypes that
disfavored women in competitive sports.62 To rely on “interest”
as opposed to enrollment in creating athletic opportunities for
men and women, although seemingly gender-neutral, would
certainly disfavor women, since “interest” in men’s athletics
would begin with a significant advantage based on historical
circumstances, and such a subjective method would run the
risk of perpetuating stereotypes and simply maintaining the
discriminatory status quo.63

56
57
58
59
60
61
62
63

Id.
Id.
Id.
Cohen I, 991 F.2d 888 (1st Cir. 1993).
Cohen II, 101 F.3d 155 (1st Cir. 1996).
Neal, 198 F.3d at 768.
Id. at 768-69.
Id.
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Relevant Cases
1. Biediger v. Quinnipiac University: Laying Out the Case

The first prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation
recently came into focus in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University,64
where the District Court for the District of Connecticut granted
preliminary injunctive relief to the coach and several incoming
and current members of Quinnipiac University’s women’s
volleyball team, prohibiting the university from eliminating
women’s volleyball as a varsity sport for the 2009-2010
academic year pending resolution on the merits of the case.65 In
March 2009, Quinnipiac University announced that due to
budgetary constraints, it planned on instituting changes to its
varsity athletic programs.66 Specifically, the university intended
to eliminate three sports teams—men’s golf, men’s outdoor
track, and women’s volleyball—and to add a women’s
competitive cheer team.67 The plan was the ultimate result of a
2008 directive issued by the vice president of the university to
the athletic director, Jack McDonald, to make a 5%-10% cut in
the athletic department budget for the 2009-2010 academic
year.68 Although McDonald’s initial proposal involved a 5%
budget cut without the elimination of any sports teams, the
vice president rejected this proposal and specifically directed
him to eliminate women’s volleyball, which would free up the
facility where the team played for a variety of other uses by the
university, which was faced with a space crunch.69 The
amended proposal, which included the elimination of three
teams and budget reductions for other varsity teams, would
result in a 7% reduction of the athletic department’s budget
from the previous year.70
The plaintiffs were five female athletes, all of whom
planned to play on Quinnipiac’s volleyball team in the 20092010 season, as well as the coach of the team.71 They claimed
64

616 F. Supp. 2d 277 (D. Conn. 2009).
Id. at 278-79.
66
Id. at 278.
67
Id.
68
Id. at 280, 288.
69
Id. at 288.
70
Id.
71
Id. at 279-80. Plaintiff Stephanie Biediger was a freshman and recipient of
the volleyball team’s Most Valuable Player award for the 2008-2009 season. She was
recruited to play volleyball for Quinnipiac from her home state of Texas. Plaintiff Kaya
65
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that the university’s adoption of its proposed plan would render
it noncompliant with the requirements of Title IX.72 In the
2008-2009 academic year, Quinnipiac had an undergraduate
enrollment of 5455 students: 2089 (38.3%) men and 3366
(61.7%) women.73 However, on its annual Equity in Athletics
Disclosure Act (EADA)74 report for 2007-2008, it reported
athletic participation opportunities of 45% for men and 54% for
women, and on its preliminary EADA report for 2008-2009, it
reported 47.43% for men and 52.57% for women, percentages it
conceded were not in proportion with those of the
undergraduate population.75 Further, in 2006, the university
performed a “gender equity self-study,” which “revealed that
the school was not achieving gender equity in its athletic
participation opportunities.”76 In response to this finding, the
athletic department decided to implement a roster management
policy in 2006.77 Under this policy, McDonald and the senior staff
of the athletic department set a roster size for each varsity team,
Lawler, also a freshman in the 2008-2009 season, was recruited for the team from her
home state of Indiana. Plaintiff L.R. was a high school senior from Ohio who had been
recruited to join the team in fall of 2009. Plaintiff Erin Overdevest was a senior in 20082009, who redshirted the season due to a shoulder injury and intended to play her final
year of eligibility in 2009-2010 while completing a five-year bachelors/masters
occupational therapy program at the university. Plaintiff Kristen Corinaldesi was a
junior during the 2008-2009 season who intended to play as a senior in 2009-2010.
Plaintiff Robin Lamott Sparks was recruited for the position of head coach of the women’s
volleyball team in the spring of 2007. Although her employment contract was due to
expire in June 2009, she expected it would be renewed until the university announced the
plan to eliminate the volleyball team. Id. Since the original grant of a preliminary
injunction, a class consisting of “[a]ll present, prospective, and future female students at
Quinnipiac University who are harmed by and want to end Quinnipiac University’s sex
discrimination in: (1) the allocation of athletic participation opportunities; (2) the
allocation of athletic financial assistance; and (3) the allocation of benefits provided to
varsity athletes” has been certified by the court. Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., No.
3:09cv621, 2010 WL 2017773, at *1, *8 (D. Conn. May 20, 2010).
72
Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 279.
73
Id. at 280.
74
The Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act
requires co-educational institutions of postsecondary education that
participate in a Title IV, federal student financial assistance program, and
have an intercollegiate athletic program, to prepare an annual report to the
Department of Education on athletic participation, staffing, and revenues
and expenses, by men’s and women’s teams. The Department will use this
information in preparing its required report to the Congress on gender equity
in intercollegiate athletics.
Equity in Athletics Disclosure Act Summary, http://www.ed.gov/finaid/prof/resources/
athletics/eada.html; see also 20 U.S.C. § 1092(e) (2006).
75
Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 281.
76
Id. at 283.
77
Id.
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and the coaches were expected to have the set number of
athletes on their rosters the first day of competition.78 According
to McDonald, the roster management policy provided the benefit
of being able to increase athletic participation opportunities for
women without adding more sports teams by simply adding
roster spots to already existing teams.79
The university announced that its new plan was
designed to reduce overall athletic spending while maintaining
percentages of athletic participation opportunities for men and
women in substantial proportion to its anticipated
undergraduate enrollment for the 2009-2010 academic year.80
Therefore, Quinnipiac relied upon satisfaction of the first prong
of the OCR Policy Interpretation for compliance with Title IX
in 2009-2010.81 The court noted that failure to meet this prong
would, without a doubt, render the university noncompliant
since the other two prongs were clearly not satisfied.82 Plaintiffs
put forth several arguments to show that the university’s plan
would fail to achieve the substantial proportionality required
by the first prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation.83 The court
concluded that two of these arguments—that Quinnipiac used
an improper method of counting track athletes, and that
competitive cheer did not qualify as a “sport” under Title IX
analysis—were unlikely to succeed on the merits.84 However,
the court determined that a third argument was likely to
prevail; namely, the argument that Quinnipiac did not satisfy
the first prong “due to problems with its roster management
policy and its reliance on setting roster floors for women’s
teams.”85 Specifically, the court found that as it was being

78

Id.
Id.
80
See id. at 283.
81
Recall that the first prong looks to “[w]hether intercollegiate level
participation opportunities for male and female students are provided in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments.” 44 Fed. Reg. 71,413,
71,418 (Dec. 11, 1979).
82
Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 294. The court noted that the second and third
prongs would not be satisfied because, by eliminating women’s volleyball when there
was sufficient interest to field a team, the university would fail to demonstrate a
commitment to “expanding opportunities for the underrepresented gender”—the
requirement of the second prong—or that it had “fully and effectively accommodated
the interests and abilities of that underrepresented gender”—the requirement of the
third prong. Id.
83
Id. at 295.
84
Id.
85
Id.
79

2010]

LEAVE IT ON THE FIELD

279

employed, the roster management policy did not “produce
sufficient genuine participation opportunities for women.”86
Quinnipiac argued that its overall plan—a plan that
included (1) the elimination of two men’s teams and one
women’s team; (2) the elevation of one women’s team to varsity
status; and (3) the continuation of roster management
policies—would result in 63% women and 37% men
composition of athletic participants, mirroring that of the
student population.87 It pointed to the 1996 OCR Clarification
of the Policy Interpretation’s three-part test to justify these
practices, specifically the Clarification’s explicit acceptance of
roster management practices, “including capping participation
opportunities and cutting teams, as acceptable measures to
achieve substantial proportionality.”88 The OCR Clarification
also weighed in favor of the university by stating that,
generally, not only would the OCR count athletes reported on a
squad list on the first day of competition as participants, but it
would also count those athletes who practice but do not
compete with the team.89 This was significant for Quinnipiac,
since its roster management policies involved having coaches
fill a predetermined number of roster spots, which were
recorded by the athletic department on the first day of
competition, and therefore were computed into the EADA
report.90 If some of these athletes continued to practice with the
team but were no longer part of the competition roster,
Quinnipiac could still count them as participants.91
The court, however, noted that the OCR Clarification
Memorandum and its accompanying “Dear Colleague” letter
also advised that “participation opportunities must be real, not
illusory.”92 With this in mind, the court looked to the evidence
to determine the real impact of the roster management policy
as it was being used by Quinnipiac’s athletic department.93 The
policy, although introduced in 2006, was first enforced during
the 2007-2008 season.94 It was laid out in the athletic
department’s staff manual and also discussed at the annual
86
87
88
89
90
91
92
93
94

Id. at 296.
Id. at 294.
Id. at 296; Clarification Memo, supra note 28.
Clarification Memo, supra note 28.
Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 283.
Id. at 286.
Id. at 296.
Id. at 283-88.
Id. at 283.
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athletic department staff meeting.95 Both the athletic director,
Jack McDonald, and the Senior Women’s Administrator and
Assistant Athletic Director for Compliance,96 Tracy Flynn,
testified that the reactions among coaches to the
implementation of the roster management policy were
negative.97 The general response from men’s team coaches was
that the set roster numbers were too low in relation to their
needs, and the general response from women’s team coaches
was that the numbers were too high.98 While the EADA report
for the 2007-2008 season indicated that the set roster numbers
were adhered to so that the university achieved substantial
proportionality, testimony of members of the athletic
department, along with the “add/delete” lists for the 2007-2008
season, revealed that the EADA report did not tell the full
story.99 Two men’s teams, baseball and lacrosse, had “deleted”
team members from the roster prior to the first day of
competition and then “added” them back to the team for the
remainder of the season, changes that were never reflected in
the EADA report provided to the Department of Education.100
Similarly, several women’s teams used this “add/delete”
strategy to the opposite effect, adding players before the first
day of competition who were subsequently cut from the team or
quit.101 Flynn testified that such “roster manipulation”
decreased in the 2008-2009 season based on the “add/delete”
lists, but the testimony of McDonald and the women’s softball
coach, Germaine Fairchild, confirmed that it still occurred.102
2. Biediger: The Outcome
It is unsurprising that the court found that if such
roster manipulations were, in fact, occurring to a degree
sufficient to skew the numbers so that substantial
proportionality was no longer achieved, it would prevent

95

Id.
This position entails ensuring the university’s compliance with NCAA
rules and regulations; overseeing the university’s budget and “add/delete” list; and
along with the athletic director, compiling the annual EADA report. Id. at 280.
97
Id. at 283.
98
Id. at 283-84.
99
Id. at 284.
100
Id.
101
Id. at 285.
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Quinnipiac from satisfying the first prong of the OCR Policy
Interpretation’s three-part test.103 As the court noted, Title IX
requires more than merely showing gender equity on the EADA
report. Although an EADA report can be used to make a prima facie
showing of substantial proportionately, plaintiffs are permitted to
look beyond those numbers, as they have done here, to determine
whether those EADA numbers actually represent genuine, not
illusory, athletic participation opportunities.104

The court further concluded that there was no indication that
the roster manipulations would cease in the 2009-2010 season,
when the university planned to institute its new plan.105 If the
gap between the numbers recorded on the EADA report and
the actual participation numbers in 2007-2008 and 2008-2009
remained consistent in 2009-2010, then “retaining the women’s
volleyball team would only just restore proportionality.”106 The
court held that this reasoning was sufficient to grant the
preliminary injunction to the plaintiffs, prohibiting Quinnipiac
from eliminating the women’s volleyball team for the 20092010 season.107
3. Choike v. Slippery Rock University
The Biediger court discussed one other case, Choike v.
Slippery Rock University,108 in which a court examined a
university’s roster management policy in making a
determination on Title IX compliance.109 In that case, as in
Biediger, Slippery Rock University implemented roster
management as a means of remedying its known violations of
Title IX.110 Although the university had failed in its attempt to
use roster management in the past by not including any
repercussions for coaches who did not meet targets, it planned
to strictly enforce the policy in the upcoming year.111 However,
for several reasons, the court found that the university’s plan
to achieve substantial proportionality through use of its
proposed roster management plan was “too speculative at this
103
104
105
106
107
108
109
110
111

Id. at 298.
Id. at 297.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 298.
No. 06-622, 2006 WL 2060576 (W.D. Pa. July 21, 2006).
Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 296-97.
Choike, 2006 WL 2060576, at *4.
Id.
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juncture to satisfy Title IX.”112 First, like the situation in
Biediger, its use of roster management had failed in the past.113
Second, the proposed plan created many new roster spots on
women’s sports teams with “no indication that the current SRU
female student population would actually fill these newly
created positions.”114 Because the set roster sizes for women’s
teams were not a product of “research as to the needs or wants
of the female students, but based purely on the number of
positions that coaches wanted to make available to the male
athletes,” the court found the new target numbers “artificial.”115
For example, despite the university president’s testimony that
he instructed coaches not to “pad” teams with players who would
not have the opportunity to meaningfully participate, the
university allocated twenty-eight roster spots for women’s cross
country, compared to sixteen for the men’s team, and twentyeight roster spots for women’s soccer, compared to twenty-five
for the men’s team.116 In sum, the court found that allocations of
roster spots that achieve substantial proportionality only on
paper were insufficient: “[w]hile the allocated positions might
satisfy the proportionality requirement if viewed in a vacuum,
compliance would not be meaningful.”117
4. Biediger and Choike Compared
The court’s decision in Biediger is consistent with
Choike in that it too looked past the recorded numbers to reach
the conclusion that substantial proportionality, and thus the
requirement of the first prong of the OCR Policy
Interpretation’s three-part test, required something more
meaningful.118 Arguably, however, Biediger went further than
Choike because it determined that even if Quinnipiac’s
reported numbers were technically correct—in that the number
of athletes reported on the EADA report accurately reflected
the number of students who remained on the team throughout
the season—the policy of setting roster floors could still create
a Title IX compliance problem because the participation of
112
113
114
115
116
117
118

Id. at *8.
Id. at *4.
Id. at *8.
Id. at *7.
Id. at *8.
Id.
Biediger v. Quinnipiac Univ., 616 F. Supp. 2d 277, 297 (D. Conn. 2009).
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some of these athletes might not be “meaningful.”119 In other
words, Choike suggested that the university could meet the
requirement of substantial proportionality if it had a stronger
basis for showing that the spots allotted to female athletes
would, in fact, be filled,120 whereas Biediger suggested that
merely filling the spots still might not be enough to constitute
“meaningful participation.”121
The court in Biediger acknowledged that “further
evidence and analysis of Quinnipiac’s roster management
policy as it affects the individual teams” would be necessary
before it could make a decision on the merits as to whether the
university satisfied the “substantial proportionality” standard
of the first prong of the three-part test.122 The court adopted the
view that the first prong serves as a “safe harbor” for
universities, so that achieving gender parity between the body
of student-athletes and the student body at large is enough for
an athletic program to comply with Title IX.123 However, it
stressed that “the focus of prong one . . . is genuine
participation opportunities.”124 In this light, the court said that
Quinnipiac’s roster management policy, and specifically the
practice of setting roster floors, would likely fail to satisfy the
first prong.125 Although roster management policies had been
deemed an acceptable means of satisfying the first prong in
previous cases, the court “found no case law or other authority
that sanctions the use of floors—in contrast to the use of caps,”
as part of such policies.126 According to the court, the distinction
between the two was great—“[t]here is a significantly different
impact on athletic participation opportunities resulting from the
use of roster floors than from the use of roster caps.”127
Specifically, while roster caps limit the number of participants,
and consequently might deny opportunities to some students
119

See id. at 298 (“The plaintiffs have successfully demonstrated that the
practice of setting roster floors does not correspond to an equal number of genuine
athletic participation opportunities, which is what matters for purposes of complying
with Title IX in spirit and in fact.”).
120
“Unless and until SRU can demonstrate that those additional positions are
meaningful—i.e., filled, they have not complied with the substantial proportionality
prong of Title IX.” Choike, 2006 WL 2060576, at *8.
121
See Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 298.
122
Id. at 297.
123
Id. at 294.
124
Id. at 297.
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Id. at 298.
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Id. at 296.
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Id.
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who are able and willing to meaningfully participate, roster
floors require that a certain number of spots be filled regardless
of whether there are enough qualified athletes to fill them.128
The court reasoned that “players whose principal role is
to provide a gender statistic” are not being provided with
genuine participation opportunities.129 The testimony of the
Quinnipiac head women’s softball coach, Germaine Fairchild,
supported this contention. Fairchild said that she felt pressure
to accept more players than were necessary130 and than she
could reasonably accommodate, given the team’s budget and
coaching resources.131 Despite this, along with her explanation
that she could not provide a “legitimate Division I experience”
to that many players, Fairchild received no guidance or
additional support from the athletic department in order to
adjust to the requirement.132 Further, although the 1996 OCR
Clarification specified that athletes who practice but do not
compete with a team are considered participants,133 Fairchild’s
testimony demonstrated that if these athletes were there
strictly to fulfill a requirement, their participation was likely
not meaningful.134 In order to “make the numbers” in 2007,
Fairchild accepted onto the team all of the athletes who tried
out, but after the first day of competition, she informed several
of them that they would be on the “practice squad,” and
therefore would not have uniforms and could not travel with
the team.135 She testified that nine players quit the team over
the course of the next several months, bringing the roster size
down to seventeen, a reduction of over one third of the initial
roster, for the start of the competitive spring season.136
C.

Implications of Biediger

Arguably, the willingness of the Biediger court to look
beyond the numbers in the manner it did represents a decrease
in the security of the “safe harbor” prong of the OCR Policy
128

Id.
Id.
130
The roster floor was set at twenty-five players, though Fairchild usually
carried a squad of sixteen to eighteen. Id. at 285.
131
Id.
132
Id.
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Clarification Memo, supra note 28.
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Interpretation’s three-part test. This is significant because the
“substantial proportionality” standard is the “least subjective of
the three compliance avenues monitored by the Office for Civil
Rights.”137 The court made a compelling argument as to why
roster floors may pose a problem with regard to providing
genuine athletic opportunities to both sexes under the
requirement of the first prong. However, in doing so, it chose to
examine the quality of the participation in a manner that
courts have not previously utilized when considering the
“substantial proportionality” standard. Although the court
noted that the specific practice of setting roster floors—in
contrast with roster management policies in general—had
never been authorized by the courts,138 the use of both floors
and caps has become a common practice among National
Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) programs.139 The trend
is consistent with what the court found had occurred at
Quinnipiac—namely, (1) that men’s team coaches “often
fe[lt] . . . restricted,” forced to make cuts where they otherwise
would not; and (2) that women’s team coaches “face[d] having
to convince more players to fill roster spots,” where “the
additions may not possess the talent or desire of their
teammates.”140 In response to the criticism that “roster
management is simply making more room on the bench for
female athletes,” a former collegiate athletic administrator and
NCAA lecturer on the subject of roster management, Elaine
Driedame, has advised that when it is well implemented, roster
management need not have this effect, at least not to a
significant degree.141 However, Driedame acknowledges
successful implementation of roster management depends on
focusing more on controlling roster sizes of men’s teams than
on imposing roster floors on women’s teams.142 That said,
137

Paul Steinbach, Count on It, ATHLETIC BUS. (Oct. 1, 2000), http://
www.athleticbusiness.com/articles/default.aspx?a=55&template=print-article.htm.
138
Biediger, 616 F. Supp. 2d at 296.
139
See Steinbach, supra note 137; Michael L. Kasavana, Roster Management Not
a Means to Equitable Ends, NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N FAC. VOICE (Aug. 28, 2000,
11:23 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/ncaa/ncaa+news/ncaa+news+online/
2000/editorial/roster+management+not+end+to+equitable+means+-+8-28-00 (2000). As the
athletic department at Quinnipiac had done, the common practice seems to be to set target
roster numbers for each team that serve simultaneously as “floors” and “caps,” with
women’s teams tending to view the targets as the former and men’s teams, the latter. See
Kasavana, supra note 139; Steinbach, supra note 137.
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Steinbach, supra note 137.
141
Id.
142
Id.

286

BROOKLYN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 76:1

Driedame supports a limited amount of “padding” women’s
teams with additional players—for example, a soccer squad of
thirty or thirty-five as opposed to twenty-eight or thirty—so
long as these additions come with the appropriate coaching
resources.143 She suggests that teams forced to carry additional
players take measures such as beginning the season earlier to
stimulate enthusiasm among women who will likely see little
playing time, and notes that athletes are more likely to remain
on the team if they feel they are receiving adequate attention
and are improving.144
Driedame’s remarks are particularly insightful with
regard to Biediger in light of the testimony of Quinnipiac’s
women’s softball coach, Germaine Fairchild, regarding her
experience with the university’s roster management policy.
Fairchild was required to take at least twenty-five players on
her team, which represented almost a 40% increase over the size
of her typical roster.145 The dramatic increase in players,
however, did not come with an “increase in budget, extra
equipment, additional assistant coaches, or a raise in salary to
account for and/or accommodate the extra players.”146 Further,
Fairchild testified that the target roster number for her team
was set without her input as to what was reasonable, and that
she was provided with no further guidance on how to manage
under the policy.147 Even Quinnipiac’s athletic director Jack
McDonald testified that decisions about roster sizes were made
with little input from coaches, “except in the case of ‘like’ sports,
such as men’s and women’s soccer, whose coaches were asked to
agree on similar roster sizes.”148 The athletic department also
made these decisions without considering the average roster
sizes of teams in Quinnipiac’s athletic conference, instead only
relying on the average roster sizes for all of the NCAA.149 Thus,
Quinnipiac’s approach to implementing a roster management
policy contradicted Driedame’s advice that before mandating
143
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Id. at 285-86. Fairchild gave a specific example to illustrate how her
resources were unreasonably strained. Under NCAA regulations, her athletes were
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any numbers, athletic department heads should “discuss the
facts” with the coaches.150 Overall, there are strong arguments for
upholding roster management policies, including both roster
caps and floors, as part of schools’ Title IX compliance efforts.
However, as Biediger illustrates, athletic departments should be
vigilant to ensure that these policies both comply with the
statute and succeed in practicality.
IV.

SUGGESTED APPROACH FOR THE FUTURE

A.

Courts Should Balance the Interests in Enforcing Title
IX Compliance

One cannot deny the glaring evidence of gender
discrimination in education that prompted Congress to enact
Title IX. Nor can one deny the impact the statute has had in
remedying such discrimination, especially in the area of
151
athletics. However, it is risky to empower both the federal
government and the courts with authority over the affairs of
educational institutions, and Title IX decisions concerning
152
collegiate athletics have been particularly controversial. In
recent years, some have suggested that the law, at least as it
153
pertains to college athletic programs, is outdated. As such,
although Title IX was an appropriate remedy in 1972, Congress
should now take a new approach that accounts for women’s
154
increased participation in sports. As one Delaware University
student-athlete argued, “[n]ow that women’s sports are the
norm for college campuses, it should be up to those institutions
155
which sports and how much of them their community needs.”
On the other hand, there is significant evidence that gender
150

Steinbach, supra note 137.
For extensive statistical data on Title IX and athletic participation, see Teaching
Title IX, NCAA Participation and Economic Data, Women in Athletics Facts and Resources,
NAT’L COLLEGIATE ATHLETIC ASS’N (2005), http://www.ncaa.org/wps/ncaa?key=/ncaa/ncaa/
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152
For a discussion of many of the controversial cases in this area, see Donald
E. Shelton, Equally Bad Is Not Good: Allowing Title IX “Compliance” by the
Elimination of Men’s Collegiate Sports, 34 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 253 (2001).
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See, e.g., Alyssa Benedetto, College Athletics Affected by Title IX, UNIV. OF
DEL. REV. (Nov. 19, 2007), http://www.udreview.com/2.1979/college-athletics-affected
-by-title-ix-1.138104.
154
See id.; see also Andrew Santillo, Comment, National Wrestling Coaches
Association v. United States Department of Education: The Potential Takedown of the
Current Application of Title IX to Intercollegiate Athletics, 13 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L.
REV. 187 (2003).
155
See Benedetto, supra note 153.
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discrimination, although diminished, continues to exist in
collegiate athletics and that Title IX remains essential to push
156
schools toward equality. Therefore, strictly enforcing Title IX
remains a strong public interest. As a result, courts must
perform a balancing act when enforcement of this interest relies
on universities that make autonomous spending decisions.
1. The Reality of Budget Restrictions
Much of the resentment surrounding Title IX and
collegiate athletics has stemmed from the fact that many
universities have eliminated sports teams in their efforts to
comply with Title IX and the regulations of its enforcement
agency.157 When athletic opportunities are taken away from
students, it is not as satisfying to celebrate their gender
equality. While adding teams for the underrepresented gender
seems to be an equally strong option for bringing schools into
compliance under the “substantial proportionality” standard of
the first prong, it is important to remember that university
athletic departments are limited by budget restrictions.158
Perhaps the biggest advantage of roster management policies is
their potential to help bring universities into compliance with
the first prong without taking more drastic measures, such as
eliminating or adding teams.159 However, as Biediger illustrates,
roster management is sometimes used in conjunction with other
measures, such as cutting teams, in an attempt to achieve
substantial proportionality when faced with a budget crunch.
For better or worse, education in the United States has
become highly intertwined with college athletics, and for many
schools, athletic programs are a big business.160 This is
particularly true for universities whose sports teams compete
in the NCAA Division I, the highest level of intercollegiate
competition.161 Although some argue that the resources devoted
to collegiate athletic programs are excessive, “[f]or most
156
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schools, the decision to maintain—or even grow—athletic
programs is unquestioned because of the perceived benefits to
the campus as a whole.”162 These “perceived benefits” derive
from the image of having major sports teams associated with a
university’s name, which gives the institution a higher
profile.163 Although universities with athletic departments in all
three NCAA Divisions maintain programs at least to some
degree for direct benefit of student-athletes,164 Division I
programs in particular emphasize the experience of the
spectators.165 Given the “business” aspect of athletics at many of
these schools, a conflict often arises between the need to
comply with Title IX, on the one hand, and the pressure to
make profitable decisions for the university regarding how
many and which sports teams to support, budget allotment,
and controlling roster sizes, on the other.
2. Cases Illustrating the Conflict
An example of this type of conflict was illustrated in a
1993 case, Favia v. Indiana University of Pennsylvania, in
which the court issued a preliminary injunction against
Indiana University of Pennsylvania based on its finding that
the university had violated Title IX by cutting certain women’s
teams.166 Specifically, the court found that the university failed
to satisfy either the “substantial proportionality” prong or the
other two prongs of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part
test.167 The vice president of student affairs gave testimony
regarding the “importance of football and men’s basketball in
terms of prestige and of their being important factors in
attracting the attention of potential students.”168 Although the
court said it sympathized with the university’s position and
understood both that football was an expensive sport to fund
162
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and that, due to its large roster, it was largely responsible for
the imbalance in the male-to-female athlete ratio, it stated
bluntly that these facts did not get the university off the hook:
“Title IX does not provide for any exception to its requirements
simply because of a school’s financial difficulties. In other
words, a cash crunch is no excuse.”169 The fact that football
teams typically carry very large rosters consistently creates a
challenge for schools that have such teams; because it is rare
for any women’s team to carry a roster comparable in size, it
usually takes multiple women’s teams to offset these numbers.170
However, as the Favia court made clear, Title IX makes no
exceptions to account for such challenges.171 Further, the
“substantial proportionality” prong refers only to numbers of
individual athletic participants, not to the ratio of men’s teams to
women’s teams offered by a university.172
Courts have rightly held that the public interest is
served by promoting compliance with Title IX.173 However, a
university has reason to argue that it is in a better position
than the courts “to decide both which intercollegiate sports best
meet the needs and interests of its own students, and how to
allocate resources during a difficult economic time.”174 In
Choike, Slippery Rock University made a similar public policy
argument against the injunctive relief sought by the
plaintiffs—namely, to order the university to reinstate the
women’s swimming team and women’s water polo team for the
2006-2007 academic year.175 The argument was that the public
interest was best served by the university using its federal
funds to “support the essential academic functions of a public
university, and thereby encourage a wide and diverse range of
academic disciplines and degree programs, rather than provide
a specific, extracurricular athletic opportunity for a small
number of individual students.”176 The court agreed with this
argument but stated that it was nonetheless impermissible for
169
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the university to provide extracurricular opportunities (if it
chose to provide them) in disproportionately large numbers to
men.177 The court also noted that if the university implemented
a plan that brought it into compliance with Title IX, such as a
roster management policy that it could demonstrate actually
worked, it might be permitted to eliminate the women’s
swimming and women’s water polo teams.178 In this way, the
court made it clear that its ruling was not meant to impose a
specific plan upon Slippery Rock University’s athletic
department, therefore depriving it of its choice as to what
sports teams to field and fund, but rather to prevent the
university from taking steps to bring it further out of
compliance with Title IX.
Despite the Choike court’s statement that it “[did] not
mean to minimize SRU’s valid concern of judicial interference
with its independence in deciding how to allocate its limited
financial resources,”179 it easily concluded that the estimated
$65,000 it would cost the university to maintain the women’s
swimming and women’s water polo teams for the 2006-2007
academic year was “minimal” compared to the potential harm
to the plaintiff athletes if their teams were eliminated.180
Notably, in this instance, Slippery Rock University’s athletic
department had not haphazardly chosen to eliminate some of
its women’s sports teams. In fact, five of the eight teams that
were eliminated as part of the budget-reducing plan were
men’s teams, and the decisions were based on “a spreadsheet
with a set of criteria by which all 23 teams would be assessed
and ranked.”181 These criteria “included both financial data . . .
and non-financial evaluative measures, such as how competitive
each team was, the academic performance of the student-athletes,
the quality of the coaching staff, and the condition of the
facilities.”182 Missing from the university’s spreadsheet, despite
177
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recommendations by the University Athletic Council that they be
included, were considerations about gender equity and Title IX
compliance.183 Further, the university president deliberately
disregarded the University Athletic Council’s advice on this
matter because “he wanted to keep financial decisions completely
separate from Title IX decisions.”184
3. Achieving the Balance
As Choike and other cases illustrate, the desire to keep
financial considerations distinct from Title IX decisions is
wholly unrealistic. Decisions made in order to comply or
maintain compliance with Title IX are oftentimes not
financially convenient for a university, and may even be
financially injurious. The bottom line is that schools must
accept this reality and courts should not accept the “budget
crunch” excuse to gender discrimination. At the same time,
when fashioning remedies, courts should keep in mind the
OCR’s intention to “provide[] institutions with flexibility and
choice regarding how they will provide nondiscriminatory
participation opportunities” in their athletic programs.185
Courts have recognized the importance of allowing
schools to maintain a degree of autonomy in making funding
decisions. For instance, in a case in which state university
students challenged as unconstitutional the school’s refusal to
fund certain religious-oriented activities out of its segregated
fee account, the court noted “that it would not be in the public
interest to enter a permanent injunction that compels the
university to fund, or prohibits the university from refusing to
fund, any particular category of activity.”186 Likewise, courts
have employed “balancing of interests” approaches in related
contexts. For instance, in fashioning remedies under the
Individuals with Disabilities in Education Act, courts often
balance the interests of a school district, taking into account its
use of resources, with the interests of the disabled student and
his or her family.187 We are at juncture where great strides have
been made, and yet significant action remains necessary to
183
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eliminate gender discrimination in sports and where schools
face unprecedented budgetary constraints.188 Especially given
these circumstances, courts must balance competing interests
to enforce Title IX effectively while minimizing judicial
interference in the functions of educational institutions.
B.

The Substantial Proportionality Standard and the
Meaningful Participation Requirement Should Remain
Objective

In Choike, the real trouble for Slippery Rock University
was that it was aware that it had not been compliant with Title
IX at least from 2001 through 2005 (either in achieving
substantial proportionality or in satisfying the other
requirements of the OCR’s regulations)189 and that it eliminated
women’s sports teams.190 In other words, knowing that a
disproportionately small number of its athletic participants
were women, it still took measures that worked to aggravate,
rather than rectify, the situation. The court granted a
preliminary injunction in Biediger for virtually the same
reasons.191 Furthermore, in Choike, as in Biediger, the
university was relying on a roster management policy as an
integral part of the overall plan to bring it into compliance with
Title IX and, specifically, with the “substantial proportionality”
standard of the first prong.192 However, in both cases, the courts
found that the roster management policies as implemented did
not provide the “meaningful participation” required by the first
prong.193 Specifically, both courts found that athletic
participation opportunities were offered in numbers
substantially proportional to the gender compositions of the
schools’ student bodies only on paper.194
188
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In Choike, the problem that prevented participation
opportunities from being “meaningful” was that the university
provided no evidence that it had the ability to fill all of the
roster spots it allotted to women’s teams.195 In Biediger, the
roster management policy created more complex impediments
to achieving “meaningful participation.” In the years since
implementation, women tried out for the teams in sufficient
numbers to fill the set roster spots.196 However, many of the
women who represented the “extra” roster spots—added
through the roster management policy—did not remain on the
team throughout the season; rather, the coaches either cut
them or they chose to leave.197 Understandably, the court
concluded that regardless of what the EADA reports showed,
women who did not remain on a team for a significant portion
of the season were not “meaningful” participants.198 The
concerning aspect of the court’s opinion is its assertion that
even if the women remained on the team throughout the
season, their participation might not be “meaningful” such that
they would count as participants for purposes of the first prong
of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test.199 The OCR
has specifically said that athletes who only practice with, but
do not compete on, a team may be counted as participants for
purposes of Title IX.200 It should not be the court’s role to decide
if an athlete who has chosen to remain on a team, whether on
the competition roster or in a practice-only capacity, is a
meaningful participant in athletics. The fact that an athlete
has made the decision to remain on the team signifies that the
experience is “meaningful” enough to her to justify her
commitment to the team. How meaningful a judge perceives
that personal experience to be should not factor into the
equation. In other words, it should not be the role of a court to
examine the quality of an athlete’s participation in determining
whether to count that athlete for purposes of compliance with
the “substantial proportionality” standard.
If courts were to take the activist approach implied in
Biediger, what factors would they use in determining whether
the quality of participation met the threshold for being
195
196
197
198
199
200
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“meaningful”? Arguably, this approach would create confusion
and lead to arbitrary results. The 1979 OCR Policy
Interpretation laid out three specific areas to help guide
institutions in their compliance efforts: equal athletic financial
assistance, equal treatment and benefits for athletic teams, and
effective accommodation of student interests and abilities.201 The
OCR Policy Interpretation included the three-part test in order
to define what constitutes the third of these areas, effective
accommodation of students’ interests and abilities.202 Therefore,
regardless of whether, or how, an institution complies with the
OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test, it is still required to
show compliance in the other two areas: equal athletic financial
assistance, and equal treatment and benefits for athletic
teams.203 Presumably, factors such as the amount of financial
assistance and the treatment and benefits afforded an athletic
team would affect how “meaningful” participation is for the
athletes on that team. However, these factors are considered
independently of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test
and should play no role in an assessment of whether an
institution satisfies the first prong of that test, the “substantial
proportionality” standard. The first prong is intended to be an
objective standard, and despite the arguments against it being
considered a “safe harbor,” there are important reasons why it
should remain objective.
C.

The Biediger Court Should Not Have Expanded the Scope of
Analysis Under the Substantial Proportionality Prong

As this part of the note has already discussed, Title IX
compliance can impose significant challenges for universities
by requiring them to use what are often limited financial
resources for athletic programs in ways that do not necessarily
maximize financial gain and in ways that inevitably leave
certain parties dissatisfied.204 Despite these challenges, Title IX
has proven instrumental in providing more equitable collegiate
athletic opportunities for women, who were largely excluded
from such opportunities for many years.205 Therefore, the
201
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statute and its regulations continue to have great importance
in this arena, and the challenges they impose upon universities
are justified by the rewards. Nevertheless, universities serve
extremely important functions beyond their athletic programs,
and their ability to execute these functions is compromised
when they become embroiled in litigation. OCR’s pattern of
regulations, interpretations of those regulations, and
clarification memoranda regarding Title IX in the area of
collegiate athletics indicates its intention to guide institutions
in their efforts by clearly defining their responsibilities.206 The
phrase “[e]ffective [a]ccommodation of student[s’] [i]nterests
and [a]bilities”207 is an ambiguous standard. The OCR
apparently recognized this ambiguity in its adoption of the
three-part test. Within that test, the OCR rightfully included a
largely objective standard, the “substantial proportionality”
standard, which would allow universities to work toward the
clear and comprehensive goal of providing participation
opportunities for male and female students in numbers
substantially proportionate to their respective enrollments, and
therefore would entitle them to a presumption that effective
accommodation has been satisfied.208 The OCR’s 1996
Clarification Memorandum also stated, as the Choike and
Biediger courts noted, that the “participation opportunities
must be real, not illusory.”209 The Choike court went on to say
that the participation opportunities had to be “meaningful” but
explicitly defined meaningful in this situation as “filled” with
actual athletes.210 The Biediger court used the word “genuine”
as a contrast to “illusory” yet went further than Choike,
suggesting that “filled” might not be enough to satisfy the
requirement.211 In terms of analysis under the first prong of the
OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test, the Biediger court
should not have gone further than Choike by entering the
territory of examining the quality of an athlete’s personal
experience to determine whether it was sufficiently “genuine.”
Regardless of the outcome of this particular case on the merits,
206
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however, courts should refrain from expanding analysis under
the “substantial proportionality” standard in this manner.
D.

Roster Floors Should Be Permitted

The Biediger court held that the plaintiffs were likely to
succeed on the merits because “[e]ither one of those problems—
inaccurate roster numbers or setting false roster floors—is
sufficient to knock Quinnipiac out of compliance with Title IX.”212
The court’s reference to “false” roster floors indicated the policy
required coaches to take more athletes on a team than they
would otherwise choose based on the needs and resources of the
team.213 In one regard, the court in Biediger was justified in
looking with a critical eye at roster floors as part of a
university’s roster management policy. It is clear why the use of
roster floors raises a red flag in terms of the potential for
reported numbers that are not backed by actual athletes; there
can be little doubt that participation opportunities that only
exist on paper are illusory. The court in Biediger noted that
there was no case law in which the use of roster floors
specifically had been upheld.214 While the court did not commit to
a blanket prohibition on roster floors as a means of complying
with Title IX, it certainly came close: “Even if Quinnipiac’s
roster numbers are accurate, it still has a problem complying
with Title IX because it relies on a roster management policy of
setting roster floors.”215 In fact, Quinnipiac’s roster management
policy involved setting target roster numbers for each team,
which were viewed as floors by most of the women’s team
coaches and as caps by most of the men’s team coaches.216 As
previously discussed, roster management policies, which have
become a fairly common strategy college athletic departments
use to achieve compliance with Title IX, typically involve such a
combination of caps and floors.217
There are several reasons why universities should not
depend on upon roster floors in roster management policies.
The strongest reason is that no one benefits when coaches
are required to carry more athletes than they require and
212
213
214
215
216
217
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can afford.218 Coaches faced with these difficulties may
disregard the roster floor and cut players that they feel they
are unable to dedicate proper attention to (or who do not
contribute positively to the team due to inadequate skill
level or desire). Alternatively, athletes may be dissatisfied
with the experience and leave voluntarily. There was strong
evidence in Biediger that this situation had occurred with
some of the women’s sports teams at Quinnipiac.219 There was
also evidence that the university’s athletic department had
not gone about implementing the roster management policy
in a sensible fashion.220 There are, however, strategies that
universities can utilize to make roster management policies
work effectively, including those that incorporate an
appropriate number of roster floors.221
Decisions regarding how many and what sports teams a
university will provide in any given year take considerable
planning and forethought.222 A great deal of effort goes into
preparing facilities, purchasing equipment, scheduling practices
and games, staffing, and recruiting.223 Further, although
university athletic departments can use past and current
enrollment figures as a gauge for the upcoming year, the gender
composition of a student body may vary from year to year.224
Therefore, the athletic participation ratio of men to women that
a university needs to achieve “substantial proportionality” is
often “a moving target.”225 This challenge makes roster
management policies a particularly appealing option, as it
allows a university to make decisions in advance about sports
offerings and to make minor adjustments in target roster sizes
for each team based on enrollment.226 For these reasons, it would
be detrimental for a court to hold the use of roster floors to be a
per se invalid means of achieving compliance with Title IX.
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CONCLUSION
This note explores the question whether an objective
standard should be available to universities for assessing their
compliance with Title IX in the area of collegiate athletics. It
argues that an objective standard should be available and that
the court in Biediger improperly applied a subjective analysis
beyond the scope of what the OCR intended in issuing its
regulations. To return to the hypothetical posed in the
Introduction, it is not the proper role of the courts to examine
the quality of the woman’s participation on the softball team
when assessing the university’s compliance with Title IX under
the “substantial proportionality” standard contained in the first
prong of the OCR Policy Interpretation’s three-part test. The
important point is that the woman chose to join the team and
to remain on the team throughout the season. This should
indicate, for purposes of this prong, that the participation was
sufficiently meaningful. Requiring a heightened showing to
prove that participation is “meaningful” would result in
unnecessary confusion and arbitrary decision-making.
Furthermore, if the coach offered this woman a spot on the
practice roster because of an obligation to comply with a roster
floor, the use of such a roster floor should also be permissible as
a means of complying with Title IX.
ADDENDUM
On July 21, 2010, following a bench trial held from June
21 to June 25, 2010, the District of Connecticut Court issued a
decision on the merits in Biediger v. Quinnipiac University.227
Consistent with many of its initial findings supporting the
grant of a preliminary injunction,228 the court concluded that
Quinnipiac violated Title IX during the 2009-2010 academic
year by failing to offer equal athletic participation
opportunities for female students.229 In the opinion, the court
analyzed the plaintiffs’ three main arguments for why the
university was not in compliance with Title IX: (1) that
members of the competitive cheerleading team should not be
counted as athletes under the statute; (2) that certain cross227
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country, indoor track, and outdoor track athletes were
improperly counted multiple times; and (3) that the
university’s roster management policies led to roster
manipulation as well as artificially undersized men’s teams
and artificially oversized women’s teams.230
With respect to the first argument, the court agreed
that members of the cheerleading team could not be counted as
athletes because that team did not qualify as a varsity sport for
purposes of Title IX.231 With respect to the second argument, the
court agreed that some female cross-country runners had been
improperly counted multiple times for their required
participation on the indoor and outdoor track teams.232 In
addressing the third argument, the subject of this note, the
court concluded:
Finally, although I find, as a matter of fact, that Quinnipiac is no
longer engaged in the same roster manipulation that was the basis
for my preliminary injunction order, the University is still
continuing to deflate the size of its men’s rosters and inflate the size
of its women’s rosters. Although that roster management is
insufficient to conclude that Quinnipiac violated Title IX as a matter
of law, it supports the ultimate conclusion that the University is not
offering equal participation opportunities for its female students.233

The court noted the existence of little precedent “on
judging whether an athlete’s experience on a varsity team
qualifies as a genuine participation opportunity—i.e., whether
his or her participation opportunity is real, and not illusory.”234
On this point, the court was persuaded by the government’s
encouragement, expressed in its amicus brief, to “‘look beyond
[the] numbers’ and examine the quality of opportunities being
offered.”235 An examination of the quality of opportunities is
precisely the type of analysis this note argues should remain
limited when courts evaluate Title IX compliance under the
“substantial proportionality” standard.236 Nonetheless, despite
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finding that roster manipulation237 did not occur during the
2009-2010 school year, the court engaged in a detailed analysis
of “whether Quinnipiac’s mandatory roster numbers are
appropriately set and afford athletes genuine varsity
participation opportunities.”238 After comparing the sizes of
Quinnipiac’s athletic team rosters with both the conference and
national averages, the court concluded that with some
exceptions, Quinnipiac appeared to set its men’s team rosters
relatively small and its women’s team rosters relatively large,
although the differences were not dramatic.239
The Biediger court took a middle-of-the-road approach
in addressing the plaintiffs’ argument that the university’s
roster management policies resulted in too few genuine athletic
participation opportunities for women. Specifically, in light of
the finding that the university clearly “set its roster targets
with the intent of producing statistics showing that it provides
substantially proportional athletic participation opportunities
for women,” the court noted that this was “not necessarily
wrong.”240 Therefore, on its own, the evidence with respect to
the university’s roster management policies did not entitle the
plaintiffs to relief.241 Nonetheless, the court noted that this
evidence served two other purposes.242 First, it strengthened the
plaintiffs’ other argument that the university was improperly
counting female cross-country runners multiple times for their
required participation on the indoor and outdoor track teams.243
Further, it indicated to the court “that the University’s roster
targets were carefully chosen and managed, and any shortfall
in the number of Quinnipiac’s female athletes is attributable to
University decision-making and not other external factors.”244
Therefore, the court upheld the use of roster management
policies, including setting roster ceilings and floors, as a valid
means of achieving Title IX compliance.245 In doing so, however,
it seemed to suggest that a university employing a roster
237
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management system similar to that of Quinnipiac may be
subject to enhanced scrutiny in evaluating Title IX compliance.
It remains to be seen how other courts will address challenges
to roster management policies under Title IX.
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